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I. 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
1. Kristi Pace, Appellant, is an individual, and the surviving spouse of the decedent, 
William Matthew Pace. 
2. The Estate of William Matthew Pace, Appellant, is all individuals or entities that 
may have an interest at law or in equity in the remaining assets and obligations of 
the decedent William Matthew Pace. 
3. St. George City Police Department, Appellee, is a governmental agency operating 
under the City of St. George. 
4. The City of St. George, Appellee, is a governmental entity, and is an incorporated 
city within the State of Utah. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(4) and § 78-2a-3G). 
III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellant asserts that the service of the Notice of Claim by prior counsel for the 
Appellant was proper pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
1953 §63-30d-401. As such, Plaintiffs/Appellants maintain that the Trial Court 
improperly dismissed this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants assert that the governmental entities waived their sovereign 
immunity, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (2003), and that the sovereign 
immunity of the State was not maintained due to an alleged "incarceration" of the 
decedent at the time of the incident. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented are reviewed for correctness without any deference to the 
trial court's determination of law. Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287, 474 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 25 (Utah, 2003). 
V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 63-30d-401. 
2. Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 63-30-11. 
3. Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 63-30-10. 
4. Utah Code Ann. 1953, 63-30-11. 
5. Utah Code Ann. 1953, 78-2a-1. 
6. Constitution. Article 8, § 1; Utah Code Ann. 1953,78-2a-1. 
7. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6). 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Utah Legislative changes to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act went into 
effect July 1,2004. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants9 Notice of Claim was filed July 2, 2004, upon "City of St. 
George, 175 East 200 North, St. George, Utah 84770," by Plaintiffs/Appellants' prior 
counsel, Braunberger, Boud & Draper, P.C. There was no "City Clerk" within the City 
of St. George that could be served. The City Recorder is Gay Cragun, who works for the 
City of St. George located at the same address. 
Suit was filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, and service 
of the Summons and Complaint was effectuated March 4th, 2005, and was served upon 
Gay Cragun at the same address listed above. 
Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss July 11th, 2005, alleging improper 
filing of the Notice of Claim by Plaintiffs/Appellants' prior counsel, Braunberger, Boud 
& Draper, P.C. After the filing of several responsive memorandum by both sides, the 
Court issued the Defendants/Appellees' Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' lawsuit on January 18, 2006. The Defendants/Appellees5 grounds 
for dismissal were (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to an improper filing of the 
Notice of Claim, and (2) because the governmental entities had not waived their 
sovereign immunity surrounding actions with regard to the "incarceration" of William 
Matthew Pace. 
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From this order, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully appeal. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William Matthew Pace was arrested March 13, 2004 for theft. William Matthew 
Pace was wearing a prosthetic back brace at the time of his arrest and was searched by 
the arresting officers. Such search failed to produce the 9mm pistol that Mr. Pace had, on 
his person, underneath the back brace. While in custody, prior to the filing of any formal 
charges, and before interrogations were completed, William Matthew Pace was excused 
to use the restroom and his restraints were removed. While in the restroom, William 
Matthew Pace produced the 9mm pistol and fatally shot himself. 
vm 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The St. George Defendants' statement of the issues attempts unduly to broaden 
them so as to dilute the attention that each assigned error merits. A Motion to Dismiss 
requires a careful examination of the underlying facts and law. As shown in Plaintiffs' 
opening brief and below, service of the Notice of Claim was effective, and thus the 
District Court erroneouly dismissed the case. Moreover, the St George Defendants do 
not merit governmental immunity under the particular facts of this case and the law. 
Consequently, there will be matters to litigate as genuine issues of law and fact when this 
Court sets aside the dismissal of the action and remands the case for proceedings on the 
merits. This Court reviews for errors of law and, consequently, need not defer to the 
4 




I. Plaintiff Met the Requirement of Utah Statutes Concerning Service of Notice 
Of Claim 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) provides that a claim against a 
governmental entity must be filed by giving notice within one year after the claim arises 
regardless of whether the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (repealed July 2004 and replaced with Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) which does not differ appreciably from the previous statute). 
Assuming that the repealed statute controls the Plaintiffs' substantive rights; the new 
statute provides the procedure Plaintiffs could have followed for effecting a Notice of 
Claim. 
The procedure in the new statute for Notice of Claim provides that "[e]ach 
governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce 
containing: (i) the name and address of the governmental entity; (ii) the office or agent 
designated to receive a notice of claim; and (iii) the address at which it is to be directed 
and delivered." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(a). The City of St. George did just 
that. See Appellee's Brief, Addendum "Certified Copy for St. George" and 
accompanying page (asserting compliance with sub (a) above). 
5 
The new statute further provides that "the notice of claim shall be * * * directed 
and delivered by hand or mail * * * to the office of: the city or town clerk, when the 
claim is against an incorporated city or town, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A); 
* * * or the agent authorized by a governmental agency to receive the Notice of Claim by 
the governmental entity under subsection 5(e)1." Id. at (G). The Defendants' reason that 
because Plaintiffs did not "serve" the "town clerk" under sub (A) that Plaintiffs' Notice 
of Claim is deficient and therefore did not "strictly comply" with the statute. However, 
Plaintiffs' served the City of St. George's designated agent under sub (G), thus affecting 
a valid Notice of Claim. The District Court failed to account for the authorized agent 
provision under sub (G) and (5)(e), and thus erred in dismissing the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
Case law casts some light on the purpose and the interpretation of the statute. For 
example, several cases concerning full compliance with the Notice of Claim provisions 
have dealt with filing a Notice of Claim with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises. See, e.g., Busch v. Salt Lake 
International Airport, 921 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1996); Scarborough v. Granite School 
District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975). Thus, cases in which the plaintiff sent Notice of 
Claim to a claim adjuster, even perhaps at the claim adjuster's suggestion, have not 
1
 "A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to 
accept notice of claim on its behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(e). The City of St. 
George did so by identifying Gay Cragun in the statement to the Utah Department of Commerce 
Division of Corporations & Commercial Code mentioned above ("Certified Copy" in Appellee's 
Brief). Plaintiffs directed and delivered Notice of Claim to Gay Cragun. See Affidavit of Jason 
Neal, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, July 26,2005. 
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constituted adequate service. See. e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 37 P.3d 1156 
(Utah 2001) (plaintiff did not deliver the notice to the president or secretary of the UTA 
Board); Brown v. Utah Transit Authority, 40 P.3d 638 (Utah 2002) (improperly mailed 
notice to an employee of UTA's risk department); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 
(Utah 2002) (filed with commissioners rather than clerk). Wheeler dealt with a case in 
which the county argued that Plaintiffs Notice of Claim was insufficient because 
Plaintiff had served it on the Cain County Commissioners rather than upon the Cain 
County Clerk. 40 P.3d at 634. There, however, the Plaintiff did not provide notice to the 
county clerk and the court concluded that actual notice did not absolve a party of its duty 
to comply strictly with the Act. Id. at 637. Those cases are distinguishable from the case 
at bar because those Plaintiffs did not follow the statute; whereas, Plaintiffs in this case 
did. 
In interpreting a statute, the primary focus necessarily is upon the intention of the 
legislature. Any proposed interpretation of the statute must be compatible with its 
purpose and objective. Wills v. Heber Valley Hist. Railroad Authority, 79 P.3d 934, 936 
(Utah 2003) (citing O'Keefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 956 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1998)). 
Consequently, the purpose and intent of the legislature must guide a decision concerning 
"strict compliance with the notice provisions" of the Act. Thus, attempts to avoid the 
effectiveness of a Notice of Claim by the argument that the notice was delivered at the 
"wrong" address of two addresses for the Utah Attorney General were unavailing. See 
Wills, 79 P.3d at 936; see also Brown v. Utah Transit Authority, 40 P.3d 638, 639 (Utah 
7 
2002). Looking to the purpose and intent of the governmental immunity act, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that the purpose is to "afford the responsible public authorities an 
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public 
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1980). When Plaintiffs in the case at bar served Notice of Claim on Gay 
Cragun, they did all they could to effectuate valid notice under the statute. 
Defendant St. George's argument focuses on alleged failure to direct the Notice of 
Claim to the city recorder, Gay Cragun. Appellee's Brief at 13-16. That argument 
overlooks the actual service on Gay Cragun which Plaintiffs' attorney accomplished on 
March 3, 2005 pursuant to their inquiry with the St. George City offices. See Exhibit A 
of Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, attached as Appendix 1 to this brief. See also, the affidavit of Jason Neal, 
attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, attached as Appendix 2 to this brief. That affidavit notes that Gay Cragun 
inquired as to why she was being served a duplicate set of documents before she accepted 
them. (Items 23 and 25.) Thus, those exhibits prove that, among other things, Gay 
Cragun was originally served with a Notice of Claim pursuant to statute by Plaintiffs' 
prior counsel. Although Gay Cragun's name does not appear on the Notice of Claim, 
Plaintiffs directed and delivered the Notice of Claim to Gay Cragun in her official 
capacity as authorized agent at the address listed on the original Notice of Claim. 
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Consequently, this is not a case involving a service of notice which involves a 
Plaintiff giving no notice. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983). 
Nor is it a case in which the Plaintiff filed only one of the two required notices such as in 
Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Trans., 728 P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App. 1992). This also is 
not a case in which the Notice of Claim was defective in form or content such as in Cox 
v. Utah Mortgage and Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1986) (letter did not assert a 
claim for damages), or in which the Notice of Claim was not filed within one year. See, 
e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
As a further example, in Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah App. 1995) 
the county sought to dismiss because the Plaintiffs Notice of Claim was addressed to an 
attorney at the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office rather than to the county commission. 
In that case, looking to the primary purpose of the statute, the court found that proper 
Notice of Claim was accomplished "because Bischel directed and delivered her notice 
precisely as instructed by the statute and the County Commission ****." Id. at 279. In 
the case at bar, Plaintiffs served more than just the authorized agent Gay Cragun as 
directed by the city; Plaintiffs also served Notice of Claim on the governmental entity and 
governing board. It is inconsistent at best for the city to instruct Plaintiffs to serve Gay 
Cragun and then argue Notice of Claim was inadequate because Plaintiff did as directed. 
Id. Service of the Notice of Claim was sufficient and the District Court erroneously 
dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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II. The St. George Defendants are Not Immune from Suit Under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
The St. George Defendants assert that they are immune from suit under the 
doctrine of Sovereign Immunity because it is retained when a suit is for negligently 
causing injury arising out of the incarceration of any person. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(10). However, Plaintiff William Pace had not been incarcerated for purposes of the 
immunity discussed in the Madsen case. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978) 
(plaintiff injured during surgery while an inmate). Instead, Plaintiff was under arrest but 
not subject to post-sentencing confinement. As such, the government does not enjoy 
blanket immunity for its actions. 
Governmental immunity traditionally lies when the government is engaged in 
policy-making decisions (discretionary), not when the government's actions deal with the 
ministerial duties of carrying out policy. See e.g., Sandberg v. Layman, Jensen and 
Donahue, L.C., 76 P.3d 699 (Utah App. 2003). In this case, the police had arrested 
Plaintiff and he was under questioning and investigation, but he had not yet appeared in 
court and had not yet been sentenced. In carrying out the ministerial functions of arrest 
and investigation, the police necessarily must act with care, not only to protect 
themselves and the public but to protect those in their custody. Thus, this case is 
distinctly different from those in which incarceration is involved following arrest or 
sentencing or commitment to a state mental hospital because, in those instances, the 
searches conducted must necessarily be adequate to insure the safety of the confined 
individual, or others confined, and of their custodians. Thus, Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 
10 
1296 (Utah 1971) is not on point. Mere confinement does not relieve the government of 
the duty to insure, at a reasonable level, the safety of those it confines. 
III. The Concept of Governmental Immunity Does Not Exonerate the 
Government from Suit Under the Facts of This Case. 
St. George Defendants urge that, as an additional ground for affirming the District 
Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah and 
the Utah Governmental Immunities Act provide that governmental entities and their 
employees are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
"governmental function." Appellee's Brief at 19-20 citing Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) 
and 63-30(d)-201(l). Relying on the statute that states that immunity is not waived for 
injuries caused as a result of "making an inadequate or negligent inspection," St. George 
Defendant urges that the St. George Defendants' are immune from suit. Appellee's Brief 
at 20. This is because St. George Defendants insist that the St. George Defendants did 
not owe a duty to Plaintiff. 
However, St. George Defendants' argument is flawed in significant ways. When 
the government acts, it is not invariably acting in an "governmental function" that enjoys 
immunity. Instead, consistent with the concept of immunity for only discretionary or 
policy decisions, the term "governmental function" imports the concept of actions 
reflecting policy decisions only government can make. Beyond those, as the enactment 
of the governmental immunity act generally recognizes, sovereign immunity does not 
operate and the government may be liable for negligence in failing to carry out its various 
functions in a reasonable or safe fashion. See generally Condemarin v. University Hosp., 
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775 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah 1989) (citing Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980) and Brittain v. State ex rel Utah Dept. of Employment SEC, 882 P.2d 
666, 669-70 (Utah App. 1994). The negligent search in this case did not represent a 
policy decision meriting governmental immunity but rather negligence of a ministerial 
type subjecting the St. George Defendants to suit. 
St. George Defendants also urge that because there was no allegation that the 
arresting officers were aware of any suicidal potential that Plaintiff, William Pace, 
personally presented, the general rule that law enforcement officers owe a duty to the 
public as a whole, not to an individual, controls. However, duty imports the concept of 
reasonableness in dealing with the public. Consequently, officers claiming that they were 
unfamiliar with the specific tendency of the decedent is not an excuse. Instead, the risk to 
individuals acting against their interest while in confinement is sufficiently widespread 
that reasonable law enforcement procedures would encompass this possibility, requiring a 
more thorough search not only to protect the person subject to custody but the general 
public as a whole. The Kansas case Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 536 
P.2d 54, 63-64 (Kansas 1975) is not controlling, particularly because it dealt with the 
potential liability of an individual police officer, rather than the city generally. 
Moreover, even if people are inherently less controllable than physical things, a 
certain kind of relationship exists when those with authority place another individual in 
their custody. When a person exerts control over another and confines them so that they 
do not have control over their liberty, they are not able to fend for themselves. They 
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become dependent upon their custodians. Because of the individual nature of different 
people, reasonable police practices would encompass contemplating the prospect of a 
subject's suicide or the prospect of a subject harming others and reasonable procedures 
would require taking steps to prevent such harm. Thus, the question is not whether the 
arresting officers knew Plaintiff, William Pace, to be uniquely dangerous to himself, but 
rather whether a reasonable police officer, operating consistently with reasonable police 
practices, would have conducted a careful search to prevent harm to the person confined, 
to the police officers and to others in the public generally. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993) thus does not control. In Higgins, a special relationship 
and consequential duty may have existed when the Defendant knew of the potential 
danger an individual who was released from mental health ward might have posed to 
others. 855 P.2d 240. Thus, granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was error. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that the Governmental Immunity Act 
barred an action for a stabbing because of a specific provision of that act. However, that 
section does not apply here as there was no assault or battery of a third person. Thus, 
Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action and the District Court erroneously dismissed the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim has merit which a fact-finder 




For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs/Appellants' opening brief and this reply brief, 
this Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal and remand the case back to the 
District Court for trial on the merits. 
DATED this 5th day of September 2006. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Mark rtrTjraff, Attorney for Plain^ffs/A^peUa 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I, Jennifer Taylor, Legal Assistant, hereby certify that on the 5th day of September 
2006, I caused to be mailed, U.S. first-class postage prepaid, true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief, to the following: 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE 
SUITTERAXLAND 
Attorneys for Appellee, St. George Police Dept. 
8 East Broadway, #200 
P.O. Box 510506 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
SHAWN M. GUZMAN 
ST. GEORGE CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorneys for Appellee, St. George City 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
15 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A of Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Affidavit of Jason Neal, Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
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Of Counsel 
Richard I. Ashton 
[Inactive] 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
July 2,2004 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND REGULAR MAIL 
St. George Police Department 
200 East 265 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City of St. George 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Mayor Daniel McArthur 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member - Suzanne Allen 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Larry Gardner 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Rodney Orton 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Robert Whatcott 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Re: Our Client: Kristy Pace, widow to Matthew Pace 
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BRAUNBERGER, BOUD & DRAPER, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Wayne H. Braunberger 765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l 
James R. Boud Sandy, Utah 84094 
Tad D. Draper Phone (801) 562-3200 
Troy K. Walker Fax (801) 562-5250 
Date of Incident: March 13, 2004 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter shall serve as Notice of Claim upon the City of St. George pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et. seq. Further, governmental immunity is deemed waived in this matter. 
SECTION I 
Statement of Facts 
On March 13, 2004, an officer at the St. George Police Department, believed to be 
Officer Collard arranged for Matthew Pace to come into the police department for an interview 
regarding an alleged theft. At the time of the interrogation, the police department performed a 
pat down search on Matt Pace to check for weapons and presumably other potentially dangerous 
objects. It is also believed that Mr. Pace again underwent a second pat down search while in 
police custody. Subsequent to these searches, Mr. Pace asked to use the restroom. Accordingly, 
two St. George police officers escorted Mr. Pace to the restroom and stood, in presence, 
approximately 12 feet away while he was in the restroom facilities. At this time, he pulled a 
hand gun from his belt region and shot himself in the head. Mr. Pace died immediately. Mr. 
Pace was not searched with a magnetometer. 
SECTION II 
Nature of the Claim 
This claim is against the City of St. George, and more particularly the St. George Police 
Department for the wrongful death of William Matthew Pace, who, while under worry and duress 
while being in police custody, was not properly searched either manually, or through the use of a 
magnetometer for a dangerous weapon. The negligence of improperly searching and securing the 
safety of Mr. Pace directly resulted in his death, and the endangerment of other individuals in the 
police facility. The claim is brought by and through Kristy Pace, Mr. Pace's wife, and personal 
representative to his estate, both in her individual and personal representative capacity. The 
claim is asserted under one or more of the provisions of Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
SECTION III 
Injuries and Damages Sustained 
The injuries are, loss of support, companionship, society and other losses and injuries 
pertaining to a wrongful death action on behalf of Kristy Pace and the heirs of Matthew Pace. 
The compensable loss and damages resulting from the wrongful acts of the St. George Police 
Department include, but are not limited to the necessary and reasonable cost and loss associated 
with Mr. Pace's wrongful death, including funeral expenses and the economic loss, both present 
and future. The full value of this has not currently been determined, but would include a 
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calculation for present and future wage loss as well as general damages for pain, suffering, loss 
of society and companionship, which is not currently known, but will be established upon further 
discovery and investigation. 
SECTION IV 
Acknowledgment 
This Notice of Claim is intended to comply with the provisions set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-12 et seq. The undersigned is a duly authorized attorney of the Claimants by 
written agreement. 
DATED this <£ day of _, 2004 
fad D. Draper 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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